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THE APPLICABILITY OF NEPA TO NAFTA: LAW, POLITICS,
OR ECONOMICS?*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),1 is the environ-
mental Bill of Rights for individuals who want to ensure that federal
agencies consider the environmental consequences of their actions.' The
general purpose of NEPA is to harmonize man's production with na-
ture's sustenance and to preserve this harmony for future generations.3
To accomplish that purpose, NEPA requires federal agencies to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement (EIS) on proposed legislation
and on major federal actions that will significantly affect the environ-
ment.' The EIS can then be used by the decisionmaker to weigh the
environmental consequences of the proposed agency action against its
overall benefits.5
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),6 NEPA claims
are subject to judicial review when the applicable statute so provides;
however, NEPA does not provide judicial review. In the absence of
such a provision, the APA provides review of "final agency action" for
which there is no other adequate remedy.7
In Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative,8 the
* The author wishes to thank Professor John Harbison for his comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(2)(C),
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1993).
2. See Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1993) (stating
that NEPA is "our basic national charter.").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1993).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1993).
5. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative (USTR), 782 F. Supp.
139, 141 (1992) (citing Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (stating that an EIS is to "inform
decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or min-
imize adverse impacts. . ."); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (stating that the purpose of NEPA is
"to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmen-
tal consequences. .. ").
6. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1993).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1993) (emphasis added).
8. 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992). There was the original suit and three appeals.
For simplicity, the original suit is referred to as Public Citizen I (Public Citizen v.
United States Trade Representative, 782 F.Supp. 139 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), and the sub-
sequent appeals are consecutively numbered as Public Citizen II (Public Citizen v.
United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), Public Citizen
III (Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.
(121)
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plaintiffs9 claimed judicial review was required under the APA and
urged the District Court for the District of Columbia to declare that
NEPA was applicable to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).1 0 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative1
gives a definitive answer regarding NAFTA12 and has been used as
precedent for the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations. 3
NAFTA had been in negotiation since 1991 and was passed by
Congress, without an EIS, on November 18, 1993.14 The plaintiffs"s
1993)), and Public Citizen IV (Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
9. There were actually three plaintiffs (Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth and
Sierra Club) suing the USTR. Hereafter, the plaintiffs will be collectively referenced
as one, under the name Public Citizen.
10. The NAFTA will eliminate investment and trade barriers in agriculture, man-
ufacturing, and services, and will increase protection of intellectual property rights.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
11. 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
12. The court noted that it could not determine whether NEPA substantively
would apply to NAFTA because it found that there was no basis for judicial review. 5
F.3d at 551.
In Public Citizen I, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed for
lack of standing. 782 F. Supp. at 142-43. In Public Citizen II, the Appeals Court
dismissed for lack of judicial review under the APA which, requires "final agency ac-
tion." 970 F.2d at 916 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1993)).
In Public Citizen III, the District Court held that there was APA judicial review
because the USTR completed a final draft of NAFTA, and on the merits ordered the
USTR to prepare an EIS on NAFTA. 822 F. Supp. at 29.
In Public Citizen IV, the Appeals Court reversed, holding that there was no basis
for judicial review. 5 F.3d at 551. Public Citizen appealed, but the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).
13. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Public Citi-
zen v. Kantor, 1994 WL 549498 (D.D.C. 1994) relied on Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 549
(D.C. Cir. 1993), in holding that NEPA does not apply to the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which subsequently replaced the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 61 Stat., Pts. 5 and 6, TIAS No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
187, 194 (1947), with GATT 1994 and established the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In Public Citizen v. Kantor, the District Court, which is the same court that
applied NEPA to NAFTA in Public Citizen I1, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), held
that it is "clear that the Uruguay Round falls outside the reach of the APA. . ." based
on the Appeals Court decision in Public Citizen IV and Franklin v. Massachusetts,
112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992). Public Citizen v. Kantor, 1994 WL 549498, 2. The Supreme
Court in Franklin determined that the APA was inapplicable to the reapportionment
statute.
14. See generally Feature Quotations, Showdown Over NAFTA, OREGONIAN,
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argued that NAFTA was an action of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (OTR) that would have significant impact on the
quality of the human environment,'" and therefore, an EIS should have
been prepared. The case was finally resolved by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals
concluded that because the APA requires a "final agency action," there
can be no review of the trade agreement-making process. 17 The court
concluded that even though the OTR and the President worked to-
gether on NAFTA, as individual entities, the OTR took no final action
and President Clinton took no agency action.' 8 In denying judicial re-
view, the Court of Appeals never considered whether NAFTA would
have a significant impact on the environment.
Although Public Citizen stated that the decision of the Appeals
Court "would render NEPA's legislative EIS requirement judicially
unenforceable, effectively overruling two decades of NEPA jurispru-
dence and practice,"' 9 there is no jurisprudence directly on the issues
raised in the case. Cases applying NEPA to international actions are
sparse, and there are no cases applying NEPA to trade agreements.
However, because the court denied jurisdiction on a narrow interpreta-
tion of the APA, the decision redefines precedent already set for appli-
cation of NEPA to federal actions having only local or national signifi-
cance, and it prohibits the future application of NEPA to agency
actions that have Presidential involvement.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
NAFTA's implementation was statutorily authorized by the Trade
Acts.20 The Acts outline roles for the President, the OTR and Congress
in trade agreements.
Nov. 18, 1993, at A17; J. Craig Crawford, Its's a Deal: House votes for NAFTA,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al.
15. See supra note 9.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1993).
17. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 549, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).
18. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 551.
19. Appellant's Brief at 1, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
20. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-91, 2901-09 (1993). In Article I, Sec-
tion 8, of the United States Constitution, Congress is given the power to regulate for-
eign commerce. It is by this authority that it enacted the Trade Acts which enable the
President and the Office of the Trade Representative to negotiate trade agreements,
subject to congressional approval.
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A. The President's Role
President Bush and President Salinas, on June 11, 1990, endorsed
the goal of a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the
United States and Mexico and directed their trade representatives to
begin the necessary consultations and preparatory work for a round of
negotiations.21 President Bush notified Congress on September 25 of his
intent to negotiate with Mexico.2 After subsequent consultations with
Canada, the three governments decided to negotiate a three-way FTA
among the United States, Mexico and Canada. 3 In May 1991, Con-
gress delegated to President Bush the authority to negotiate such an
agreement,24 and the trilateral NAFTA negotiations began in June of
1991.25 The primary objectives of NAFTA are to:
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the
Parties; (b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free
trade area; (c) increase substantially investment opportunities
in the territories of the Parties; [and] (d) provide adequate and
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights in each Party's territory .... 26
B. The Office of the Trade Representative's Role
The OTR, 27 which is in the Executive Office of the President, 8
has had a substantial role in negotiating NAFTA. The United States
Trade Representative (USTR) has the authority to set international
trade policy, lead negotiations on and draft text for trade agreements,
and implement unilateral trade sanctions under presidential direction. 9
21. TRADE POLICY REVIEW, GATT PUBLICATIONS, April 1992, at 30.
22. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Ne-
gotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, May 1, 1991, available in
NAFTA, 1991 WL 434200.
23. TRADE POLICY REVIEW, GATT PUBLICATIONS, April 1992, at 30.
24. Id.
25. 56 Fed. Reg. 32454-455 (1991).
26. NAFTA, Art. 101.
27. The OTR originated as the Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, established by President Kennedy. Exec. Order No. 11,075, 28 Fed. Reg.
473 (1963) (Note that Executive Order 11,075 has been repealed, but the OTR still
operates under the Trade Acts of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-91, 2901-09 (1993)).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2171.
29. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2171, 2411-17 (1993).
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In addition to participating in the foreign aspects of trade relations, the
USTR plays a significant role in the domestic enactment of trade
policy."0
C. The Role of Congress
The Trade Acts incorporate the "fast track procedure" for passage
of trade agreements.31 The fast track procedure gives the President the
ability to negotiate an agreement and have it voted on quickly without
Congressional detainment or amendment. The President can invoke the
fast track process by consulting with Congress prior to negotiations,
2
notifying Congress and the public ninety days prior to negotiations,33
and submitting the final text of the agreement to Congress along with
implementing legislation. 4 Congress then has sixty days" to reject of
pass the agreement in its submitted form.36 Congress retains the au-
thority to amend the fast track procedure 7 or extend its application. 8
NAFTA was approved through the fast track procedure.39 Be-
cause the time for congressional research and debate on environmental
issues was reduced, 40 Public Citizen argued that the need for an EIS
30. For example, United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor reports di-
rectly to Congressional Committees. See NAFTA and Side Agreements, United States
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Sept. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1993).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c) (1993).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (1993).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(B) (1993). See 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2) (1993) (giv-
ing a description of necessary supporting information to accompany the agreement and
implementing legislation).
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191(c), (e) (1993).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1993).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a)(2) (1993). The fast track process was made "as an exer-
cise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate ... with
full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules... at any
time." Id.
38. This statute was limited to agreements entered into before June 1, 1991. How-
ever, Congress granted a two-year extension to President Bush for GATT and
NAFTA. Public Citizen II, 970 F.2d at 917 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(1) (1993)).
39. See generally J. Craig Crawford, Its's a Deal: House votes for NAFTA, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al.
40. No amendments to the proposed treaty are allowed, and there is a limit of
twenty hours for debate in each chamber. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2, 2902-3 (1993). How-
ever, this limited time for debate is on the final text of NAFTA. Congress had prior
copies sent to it and had been holding committee hearings. See generally NAFTA and
Side Agreements Before the House Ways and Means Committee (1993) (chaired by
Dan Rostenkowski) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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was compelling." The OTR negotiated an environmental side agree-
ment to accompany NAFTA; however, the text of NAFTA was never
renegotiated. In summarizing his administration's hope for NAFTA,
President Clinton stated that the agreement "will permit us to create
an economic order in the world that will create more growth, more
equality, better preservation of the environment and the greater possi-
bility of world peace. "42 The final version of NAFTA will:
bring together 370 million people and a gross domestic product
of $6.8 trillion - making it by far the world's largest free-
trade zone . . . [by] 1. [e]liminat[ing] trade barriers between
the three countries over 15 years ... 2. [p]romot[ing] fair com-
petition 3. [i]ncreas[ing] cross-border investment opportunities
4. [p]rotect[ing] copyrights 5. [establishing] a mechanism to
resolve disputes [and] 6. [e]stablish[ing] a framework for fu-
ture cooperation."
III. ANALYSIS
NEPA"4 does not create a private cause of action for plaintiffs to
challenge agency compliance with EIS requirements. The Appeals
Court in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative (herein-
after Public Citizen IV)" 5 interpreted the APA to deny judicial review
under NEPA; therefore, its holding extends to many statutes using the
APA as a basis for jurisdiction.
A. Final Agency Action in the Context of the APA
The making of an executive agreement is not reviewable by statute
41. See generally Appellee's Brief, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
42. President's Signature Puts NAFTA in Motion, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 9,
1993, at A4.
43. Pros and Cons of the NAFTA Accord, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1993, at A6
(stating: "[bly linking Canada, the United States and Mexico, NAFTA will create the
world's largest regional free-trade market.") See James G Treybig, The Pros and Cons
of the NAFTA, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 14, 1993, PI (stating that "[i]t will
represent 7 percent of the world's population (the European Community represents 6
percent) and produce about 29 percent of the world's gross domestic product (the EC
produces 28 percent).") See also President's Signature Puts NAFTA in Motion, DE-
TROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 9, 1993, at A4 (stating that NAFTA "creates the world's
largest and richest trading bloc, covering 360 million people.")
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1993).
45. 5 F.3d 549.
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because NEPA does not create a private cause of action.4 6 Therefore,
there is only review if the submission of NAFTA by the OTR to the
President was "final agency action for which there is no adequate rem-
edy in a court .... ",7 On the issue of finality, "[t]he core question[s]
[are] whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process,
and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the
parties."' 8
1. Completion of the Decisionmaking Process
To determine whether the decisionmaking process was complete,
the court in Public Citizen IV49 bifurcated the phrase "final agency
action" into two requirements - "final action" and "agency action."5
It incorrectly focused not on the finality of the agency action that the
APA refers to, but rather on the President's involvement in the deci-
sionmaking process and the finality of the NAFTA document.5 The
Appeals Court's bifurcation of final agency action disregards the inde-
pendence of the OTR as an agency, dilutes the integrity of the process
by which trade agreements are negotiated, and presents plaintiffs who
wish to challenge the OTR with an unavoidable dilemma.
Generally, there is reluctance to review an agency's action before
it has had an opportunity to correct its mistakes; 52 however, when the
agency refuses to act or correct its mistakes, there should be review.
The OTR had two final actions: action with respect to NEPA, which
was final when it refused to do an EIS, and action with respect to the
Trade Acts, which was final upon submission of NAFTA to President
Clinton. Thus, any mistakes the OTR might have made regarding
NAFTA would not be corrected absent judicial intervention.
The integrity of the decisionmaking process is best preserved when
the President's action is based on valid agency action because this "pro-
tects the President as well as the litigants and the public interest
against unlawful [agency] action."'53 Thus, the OTR's compliance with
all relevant statutes should have been reviewable.
The Supreme Court has recognized that when the agency action,
46. Id. at 551.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1993).
48. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 551 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.Ct.
2767, 2773 (1992)),
49. 5 F.3d 549.
50. Id. at 552.
51. Id. at 553.
52. Federal Trade Comm. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
53. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
1995]
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"[i]nstead of being handed down to the parties as the conclusion of the
administrative process, [is] . . . submitted to the President [and] ....
the terms, conditions and limitations ... are subject to his approval,..
. denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation or suspension,"", the plain-
tiffs face a dilemma. The dilemma is that "before Presidential ap-
proval, [the agency order] is not a final determination . . . and after
Presidential approval, the whole order, both in what is approved with-
out change, as well as in amendments which he directs, derives its vi-
tality from the exercise of unreviewable Presidential discretion." '
When the ultimate discretion rests with the President, there can be no
review because "Congress did not intend to subject the President to the
APA."' "5 This was the crux of the dilemma that Public Citizen faced.
When the agreement was submitted to Congress by the President, the
Appeals Court said there was finality;57 however, there was no agency
action. 58
Recognizing the difficulties that plaintiffs face when the phrase
"final agency action" is severed, some courts have interpreted "final"
as modifying the words it precedes - "agency action." The "finality"
of agency action is to be interpreted in a "pragmatic way:" 9 Judicial
review should not be unavailable simply because some other entity in
the Executive Branch, Congress, or a private entity must act before the
action will be "final." Because "final" modifies "agency action," it is
"the agency's 'final' position" that is at issue;60 "[t]he term 'agency
action' . . . embraces an agency's ... [decision], and it is the finality of
that action that we must consider." 61
2. Direct Affect to Parties
Besides being complete, final agency action must impose "an obli-
54. Id. at 109.
55. Id. at 113.
56. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (1991). See also Chicago & S. Air
Lines, 333 U.S. 103; Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2775.
57. Public Citizen IV.
58. Id.
59. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 149 (1967)).
60. International Union v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Ab-
bot Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (1967)). See also Eagle-Picher Indus. v. United States
E.P.A., 759 F.2d 905, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that a lack of uncertain or tenta-
tive language signifies that the determination is the agency's "final position").
61. International Union v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting
National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
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gation, deny a right or fix some legal relationship."62 To determine
whether the decision is one that will affect the parties, the majority in
Public Citizen IW1J focused on the procedural track of the NAFTA
document and mechanically applied a test set forth in Franklin v. Mas-
sachusetts6 without considering sharp distinctions between Public Citi-
zen's case and the Franklin line of cases. The Court in Franklin,65 ad-
dressing a reapportionment challenge, did not just summarily conclude
that the agency action was not final because it did not "directly affect
the parties."'6 6 Rather, it considered several factors that distinguish it
from Public Citizen IV: (a) the roles of and the relationships between
the agency, the President and Congress, (b) the product of the agency,
and (c) the remedy sought by the plaintiffs.67
(a) Roles and Relationships
In Franklin,68 the court questioned the constitutional reapportion-
ment procedure. In the reapportionment process, the agency has little
discretion about making a report because the Constitution mandates
certain procedural requirements. The agency acts as "a subordinate of-
ficial,"6 9 because the President can direct the Secretary on policy judg-
ments70 and instruct the Secretary to reform or redo the census.7 1 The
results of the Secretary's reapportionment report are not seen by Con-
gress or the public until the President releases his statement. The ac-
tion by the agency is "not promulgated to the public in the Federal
Register, '7 '2 and "no official administrative record is generated.17 3 In
essence, the President is the communication link between the Secretary
on one hand and Congress and the public on the other. Ultimately, no
"effect on reapportionment is felt" 74 until the President makes that
link.
However, in the process of formulating NAFTA, communication
62. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 113.
63. 5 F.3d 549.
64. 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2773.
67. See generally Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992).
68. 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992).
69. Id. at 2773 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152
(1967)).
70. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2775.
71. Id. at 2774.
72. Id. at 2773.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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was effected among the agency, Congress, and the public without sole
reliance on the President as a link. The signed version of NAFTA was
not the first version Congress and the public had seen of the agree-
ment.75 Indeed, Congress continually held hearings on NAFTA 7 and
the USTR and other members of the OTR reported directly to Con-
gressional committees. 77
(b) Products
In the reapportionment process, the report the Secretary submits
to the President is not the product that Congress votes on. The Presi-
dent, upon receipt of the Secretary's report, "shall transmit to the Con-
gress a statement ... as ascertained under the ... decennial census; '78
therefore, the President is merely using the "data from the 'decennial
census' in making his statement. ' 79 The statute does not prohibit
''amendment of the 'decennial census' itself after the Secretary submits
the report to the President,"8 nor does it "expressly require the Presi-
dent to [even] use the data in the Secretary's report."81 In the appor-
tionment process, the report of the agency is tentative and, most cer-
tainly, a "moving target."8 2
NAFTA's uncertain future did not stem primarily from the OTR
or the President. The product released by the agency was that which
Congress voted on; it was not merely a report that the President used to
make his own statement, as in Franklin.8 The President would not
75. Charles E. Roh Jr., Testimony Before the Committee on Science, Space and
Technology, Sept. 30, 1992, available in 1992 WL 360148 (NAFTA).
76. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992). See generally NAFTA and
Side Agreements Before the House Ways and Means Committee (1993) (chaired by
Dan Rostenkowski) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; NAFTA Before the Senate
Finance Committee (1993) (chaired by Daniel P. Moynihan) available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
77. See NAFTA and Side Agreements, United States Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor, Sept. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Hills Dispels
NAFTA Myths, United States Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, Sept. 21, 1992,
available in NAFTA, 1992 WL 360151. See also Charles E. Roh Jr., Testimony
Before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Sept. 30, 1992, available in
1992 WL 360148 (NAFTA).
78. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2771 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1993)).
79. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2769.
80. Id. at 2774.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2774.
83. The product (the draft text of NAFTA) that was released by the USTR was
the same product that was voted on by Congress because under the fast-track proce-
dures, it is not subject to amendment. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d). Whereas, the product (the
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have unilaterally altered its terms, because he had already signed the
agreement with Canadian and Mexican leaders.84 Although the Presi-
dent could have simply not delivered NAFTA to Congress, it is un-
likely that President Clinton would have set aside an agreement that
had been in negotiation for years by the OTR, Canada and Mexico.
(c) Remedies
To complete reapportionment, Congress used the President's state-
ment; to make the statement, the President used the Secretary's report.
Therefore, if the Secretary's report was procedurally flawed, the valid-
ity of the President's statement and Congress' reapportionment would
be questionable. Thus, as a remedy, it was necessary that the plaintiffs
in Franklin85 enjoin every party in the process - the Secretary of the
agency, the President and Congress. The district court's decision, later
overturned, "directed the Secretary to eliminate the overseas federal
employees from the apportionment counts, directed the President to re-
calculate the number of Representatives per State and transmit the
new calculation to Congress, and directed the Clerk of the House of
Representatives to inform the States of the change."86
Public Citizen neither attempted to inhibit the President's discre-
tion concerning NAFTA negotiations nor endeavored to prevent the
President's transmittal of NAFTA to Congress.8" The USTR claimed
that requiring an EIS would have prevented the executive power "from
exercising his accustomed supervisory powers over his executive of-
ficers." 88 However, while Congress' procedural reapportionment re-
quirements are directed at the agency for the use of the President,
NEPA's EIS requirement from Congress is directed at the agency for
the use of Congress. Congress would have used the EIS to evaluate the
probable environmental effects of NAFTA, as enacted. An injunction
requiring an EIS would not have substantively affected NAFTA be-
census report) that was released by the Secretary was only used by the President to
make the product that was voted on by Congress. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2769.
84. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Official Notification of Con-
gress, Sept. 18, 1992, available in 1992 WL 360153 (NAFTA).
85. 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992).
86. Id. at 2770 (referring to Franklin v. Massachusetts, 785 F. Supp. 230 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1992)).
87. Cohen v. Rice, 992 F.2d 376 (1st Cir. 1993) (Plaintiffs sought to set aside the
President's decision to close a base because the agency, in making a recommendation to
the President, had violated procedural requirements). See also Specter v. Garrett, 995
F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1993) cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 342 (1993).
88. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 2775.
1995]
132 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 19
cause it could still have proceeded to Congress in the same form, but
accompanied by an EIS.
B. Final Agency Action in the Context of NEPA
The APA grants injunctive relief to those "adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute."89
Had the court considered NEPA, it would have granted judicial review
because the obligations NEPA imposes are intended to arise before
plaintiffs are legally affected - an EIS should be done on "proposals
for legislation." 90
The EIS is a requirement enacted to serve a legislative function:
link the fact finder (the agency) to the final decisionmaker (Con-
gress). 91 It was not intended to inhibit the negotiator (the President).
This legislative function of NEPA is strongly supported by the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations,92 internal agency regula-
tions, and courts' past extensions of review.
1. CEQ Regulations
The legislative function of linking the factfinder to the deci-
sionmaker is most explicitly expressed in the CEQ regulations, which
interpret the procedural provisions of NEPA98 and are "entitled to sub-
stantial deference." 94 Although regulations allow flexibility in agency
implementation of its procedures, 95 all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment must comply with the CEQ regulations 6 when compliance is not
inconsistent with an agency's statutory requirements. 97 It was the posi-
tion of the CEQ that an EIS on NAFTA was mandated but not per-
89. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1993).
90. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1993) (emphasis added).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (stating that an EIS is to "inform decisionmakers and the
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse im-
pacts. . ."); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (stating that the purpose of NEPA is "to help public
officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences
.. ).
92. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1993).
93. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
94. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
95. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1 (1993) (stating that each agency retains "flexibility in
adapting its implementing procedures").
96. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1 (1993) (stating that "[a]ll agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment shall comply with these [CEQ] regulations").
97. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1993). See also Exec. Order No. 11,991, § 2(q), 42 Fed.
Reg. 26,967 (1977). 1
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formed. The former CEQ General Counsel, Nicholas C. Yost, specifi-
cally concluded that the plain language of NEPA requires an EIS on
NAFTA.9 8
According to the CEQ regulations, treaties99 are both "proposals
for legislation" and "federal actions." There is a "proposal" when an
agency has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one
or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects
can be meaningfully evaluated."1 ' The proposal must be for "legisla-
tion developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of a
Federal agency." 101 Even though "[d]rafting does not by itself consti-
tute significant cooperation,1 1 2 the acts surrounding the creation of
treaties, as opposed to simple submission to Congress, do constitute sig-
nificant cooperation.103 Moreover, the final draft of NAFTA was per se
legislation because the regulation specifically states that "[p]roposals
for legislation include requests for ratification of treaties."'' 4
The CEQ has identified four categories105 of federal actions that
98. See Appellant's Brief at 23 n.15, 24, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
99. Although the language applies specifically to treaties, it has been interpreted
to apply to international agreements as well. Public Citizen III.
100. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1993).
101. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1993).
102. Id.
103. Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp at 25.
104. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1993). Although the language applies specifically to
treaties, it has been interpreted to apply to international agreements as well. Public
Citizen 111.
105. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18(b)(l)-(4) (1993).
(b) Federal actions [requiring an EIS] tend to fall within one of the following
four categories:
(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and inter-
pretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 551 et seq.; treaties and international conventions or agree-
ments; formal documents establishing an agency's policies which will
result in or substantially alter agency programs.
(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or
approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative
uses of Federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be
based.
(3) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to
implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected
agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific
statutory program or executive directive.
(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or manage-
ment activities located in a defined geographic area. Projects include
actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as
federal and federally assisted activities.
199,51
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require an EIS. NAFTA arguably falls within three of these categories:
(1) "treaties and international conventions or agreements,"'106 (2)
"[a]doption of formal plans .. upon which future agency actions will
be based,'107 and (3) "systematic and connected agency decisions ...
implement[ing] a specific statutory program."108
2. Agency Internal Regulations
Some agencies and departments have explicitly mandated EISs on
certain treaties and international agreements. They have done so to
comply with CEQ requirements that mandate supplementary CEQ reg-
ulations1 09 and to ensure strict compliance with the letter and spirit of
NEPA. 10 For example, the State Department has prepared EISs"' on
numerous treaties and agreements including: the Panama Canal
Treaty,"' the Ocean Dumping Convention,'" and the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. 1 4 Various agencies have also prepared EISs on trea-
ties and international agreements that they negotiated: the EPA on the
1988 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
and the Federal Maritime Commission on the 1979 Intercontinental
Transport Agreements.'"
3. Courts' Extension of Review
In some cases, the courts have extended their jurisdiction to decide
the issue of NEPA compliance on agency action taken prior to the pro-
Id.
106. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (b)(1) (1993).
107. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(2) (1993).
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) (1993).
109. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (1993).
110. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1993).
111. 22 C.F.R. §§ 161.5(c),(d) (1993).
112. Panama Canal Treaty, Pls. Exs. 58-59 (1977).
113. Ocean Dumping Convention, Pls. Exs. 61-70 (1972). See also NORML v.
United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-33 (D.D.C. 1978) (Concluding
NEPA is applicable to effects of U.S. herbicide spraying program in Mexico.).
114. NEPA and Trade Agreements: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Env't and
Pub. Works (1993) (Statement of Nicholas Yost, Former CEQ General Counsel)
available in NAFTA.
115. Appellee's Brief at 23 n.16, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212). Also, an EIS
was prepared by the Department of Interior on the 1973 World Heritage Convention,
by the Department of Commerce on the 1975 and 1976 Interim Convention on Conser-
vation of North Pacific Fur Seals, and by the Office of the Micronesian Status Negoti-
ations on the 1984 Compact of Free Association. Id. (citing Pls. Exs. 60, 71-72, 74-76,
82 (Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Compact of Free Ass'n 1984)).
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posal stage and on ordinary legislative proposals,' 16 even though it was
the President who ultimately submitted the request or proposal to Con-
gress. " The final action of the agency, which was subject to judicial
review under APA, was the completion of the proposal or report. It was
not the actual submission to Congress because that was an act of the
President.'18 Some courts have recognized the reviewability of this
agency action under the APA, even though they may have found on the
merits of the case that there was no need to do an EIS. In some of the
following instances, there has been judicial review of: an executive
agreement," 9 deployment of MX missiles pursuant to a Presidential
recommendationt for alternative basing requirements approved by Con-
gress,10 and a submarine communications system that the President
requested."'
Under the majority's holding in Public Citizen IV, 22 there can be
no judicial review of a request for an EIS under the APA until there is
"final agency action," which does not include Presidential action.128
The concurring opinion in Public Citizen IV 2' recognized an inherent
contradiction in the majority's reading of "final agency action" when it
stated: "[t]he nub of the problem is that judicial review under the APA
demands 'final agency action' whereas the duty to prepare an impact
statement arises earlier. The main objective of an impact statement is
to ensure that the decisionmaker considers environmental effects prior
to taking action." '
116. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1986); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C.
1991).
117. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th
Cir. 1972) (holding that an EIS is required whenever agency intends to take steps that
will result in a significant environmental impact, even if these steps were planned
before the passing of NEPA).
118. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406.
119. Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 758 (D.Haw. 1990) vacated
as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding EIS not required for Presidential
agreement between the United States and West Germany regarding removal of chemi-
cal weapons).
120. Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (considering the necessity
for an EIS).
121. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984) (considering the
agency's failure to supplement its EIS).
122. 5 F.3d 549.
123. Id. at 553.
124. Id. (Randolph, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 554.
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C. Ramifications of Public Citizen IV'2 6
In its attempt to avoid mandating an EIS requirement on a trilat-
eral trade agreement, the Appeals Court may have frustrated the intent
of Congress in three ways. First, Congress had to enact NAFTA with-
out considering an EIS. Thus, the Appeals Court stripped NEPA of its
basic objective with regard to NAFTA: to inform Congress about the
environmental effects of the agreement before it was passed. 12 7 Con-
gress certainly did not receive the "[r]easonable forecasting and specu-
lation .. .implicit in NEPA."' 128 However, it is possible that many of
the consequences of NAFTA that would have been forecasted by an
EIS were in fact forecasted by the numerous hearings held by Congress
and were addressed by the environmental protection afforded in
NAFTA and the accompanying environmental side agreement. 2 9
Second, the court practically annihilated the "proposals for legisla-
tion" element of NEPA.3 0 Public Citizen IV'31 sets the stage to deny
review of all future international agreements, whether they have con-
gressional hearings and side agreements, as well as all proposals for
legislation that are routed from an agency through another entity
before finally reaching Congress. These results, if intended by Con-
gress, should have been specified more clearly as the EIS requirement
seeks to "insure that environmental information is available to public
officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are
taken."" 2
Finally, because the APA applies to every statute that does not
independently create a cause of action, the Appeals Court's interpreta-
tion of final agency action is now precedent. The court did not limit its
decision to cases that involve NEPA. Rather, it denied judicial review
for a case, having national, international, economic, social, and environ-
mental significance, on basically one word in the APA - "final." Be-
cause the court narrowly interpreted the word "final," Public Citizen
IJ" s may be used as precedent to generally deny APA review of many
126. 5 F.3d 549.
127. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d
1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir.
1985).
128. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., 481 F.2d at 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also,
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985).
129. See infra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
131. 5 F.3d 549.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1994).
133. 5 F.3d 549.
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topics.
IV. ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS IN PUBLIC CITIZEN IV
There are three viable alternatives to the court's holding in Public
Citizen IV.' First, the Appeals Court could have applied NEPA. This,
of course, is what the District Court did. It granted the plaintiffs judi-
cial review and held on the merits that an EIS was required for
NAFTA. The District Court issued an injunction to make the USTR
comply "forthwith."'" Second, the Appeals Court could have denied
judicial review altogether under the political question doctrine. Finally,
the Appeals Court could have applied equitable market considerations.
It could have granted judicial review and considered NEPA, but con-
cluded that NAFTA's economic purpose prevented it from issuing an
injunction.
A. Apply NEPA
The District Court in Public Citizen IV" did not inhibit the Pres-
ident's authority or timing to deliver NAFTA to Congress; 87 it "sim-
ply directed the Office to take another, albeit related action."138 Con-
gress, as part of its authority to create and delegate power to federal
agencies, may "require agencies to submit information to Congress, es-
pecially where, as here, the information is vital to Congress in carrying
out its constitutional authority."' 1 9 Public Citizen argued that Con-
gress, pursuant to its authority "to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions,"1 40 established the OTR, under the Trade Acts, as "the chief
representative of the United States for, international trade negotiations,
... in which the United States participates,"'' and requires the OTR,
under NEPA, to submit an EIS concurrent with NAFTA and its im-
plementing legislation.141
134. Id.
135. Public Citizen III at 35.
136. 5 F.3d 549.
137. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989). This is
unlike those cases that prevent the President from taking action, such as seeking advice
from his advisors. Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, No.
93-5086 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
138. Appellant's Brief at 31, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(C) (1993).
142. Appellee's Brief at 31, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
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1. Judicial Review of NEPA Compliance
Because it is the duty of the courts to construe congressional legis-
lation,"" they "cannot shirk this responsibility merely because [the] de-
cision may have significant political overtones.""" The Supreme Court,
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,"5 did not shirk its judicial au-
thority to interpret the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA" or the
"Act")146 and to issue an injunction against further agency action. En-
vironmental groups had sought to enjoin the construction of the Tellico
Dam until after an EIS was done. 14 7 The injunction was issued, and the
EIS revealed that in the waters below the dam there was a small popu-
lation of fish having protection under the ESA. 14
The ESA mandates that the Secretary take "such action necessary
to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species... :"19
The agency argued that "closure of the Tellico Dam, as the last stage
of a ten-year project, falls outside the legitimate purview of the Act if
it is rationally construed."' 50 However, the Court, concluding that
"once the meaning of an enactment is discerned ... the judicial process
comes to an end," announced that the statute mandates a perplexing
result but, nevertheless, one that it would not usurp. 151 Similarly, in
Public Citizen III,15 the District Court granted judicial review and de-
termined that all of the requirements of section 102(C) of NEPA were
met. 15 3
2. NEPA Requirements
At the time of Public Citizen III,' the OTR had released the
143. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986).
144. Id.
145. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
147. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806
(E.D. Tenn. 1972) affd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). The NEPA injunction halted
the construction of the dam for 21 months, even though it already had $29 million
invested in it. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 158 n.5.
148. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994).
149. Id.
150. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (1977).
151. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 195.
152. 822 F. Supp. 21.
153. Public Citizen III at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1993)).
154. 822 F. Supp. 21.
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final draft of NAFTA for the President's signature and submittal to
Congress. These actions, at a minimum, constituted a proposal that
Congress pass NAFTA and its implementing legislation.", However,
even if President Clinton had not submitted NAFTA to Congress, it is
not necessary that a proposal actually be submitted to Congress in or-
der for an EIS to be required.' 56 NAFTA is also a major governmental
action.1 57 The negotiation of NAFTA was undoubtedly a "necessary
part"1 58 of free trade which allegedly will produce the adverse environ-
mental effects. Additionally, negotiating and implementing NAFTA,
with its side agreements, required and will continue to require "sub-
stantial planning, time and expense.""'
The Proposals for legislation or major governmental action often
"significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment."' 60 To de-
termine if there is significance, courts will consider: short and long
term,1 6' national and regional,' 62 direct and indirect' " and cumulative
effects. 6" The "human environment" includes the relationship between
people, animals, nature, places, things, policy and the economy.1 65
Public Citizen produced substantial proof that NAFTA would ag-
gravate the relationship between these environmental factors. 66 The
evidence primarily addressed the most controversial issues surrounding
NAFTA: Mexico's lax enforcement of its environmental laws, the pol-
155. Appellant's Brief at 42-43, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212).
156. Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. The circuits have split on the interpretation of the term "major." Some cir-
cuits "require substantial planning, time, resources, or expenditure" to go into the fed-
eral action. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (emphasis added). Other circuits require the federal action to be a
"necessary part" of the environmental damage. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 877.
See also Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1993)).
158. Supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1993).
161. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (1993).
162. Id.
163. Direct effects "occur at the same time and place." 40 C.F.R. § 1808.8(a)
(1993). Indirect effects "are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still
reasonably foreseeable." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1993). In fact, they "may be more
significant than the... primary effect." Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at
1434.
164. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1993) (Cumulative effects result when past actions are
added to present actions and reasonably foreseeable future actions to create adverse
impact).
165. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.14, 1508.27(b)(l)-(10) (1993).
166. See Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. 21 (citing Plaintiff Public Citizen Aff.).
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lution density of the U.S.- Mexico border region, and the probability
that American environmental laws would be weakened.167
It was the position of the Executive Office that NAFTA would
improve the environment by "maintain[ing] U.S. environmental, safety,
and health standards; allow[ing] us to enact even tougher standards;
and encourag[ing] our partners to strengthen their standards."1 68
NAFTA supports the Executive Office's position with its environmental
side agreement: This side agreement explicitly recognizes the right of
each country to prohibit the importation of goods which fall below do-
mestic environmental standards.16 9
In February 1992, the USTR and the EPA released a comprehen-
sive Environmental Review which also supported the Executive Office's
position in various ways. 70 First, the review concluded that NAFTA
would provide Mexico with resources to enforce its laws."' In 1988,
Mexico enacted the General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Envi-
ronmental Protection 172 and, since then, has been enforcing it with
rigor. 173 Second, the review refuted the "pollution haven" myth. 174
167. See generally "Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connec-
tion with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement," May 1, 1991,
available in 1991 WL 434200 (NAFTA); "NAFTA Before the Comm. on Science,
Space and Technology," (1992) (Testimony of Charles E. Roh Jr., Assistant United
States Trade Representative for North American Affairs) available in NAFTA, 1992
WL 360148; "Hills Dispels NAFTA Myths," United States Trade Representative
Carla A. Hills, Sept. 21, 1992, available in NAFTA, 1992 WL 360151.
168. "San Antonio Meeting and Initialing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, The White House Office of the Press Secretary," 1992, available in 1992
WL 360158 (NAFTA).
169. NAFTA: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Before the Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, (1992) (Testimony of Charles E. Roh Jr., Assistant
United States Trade Representative for North American Affairs) available in 1992
WL 360148 (NAFTA).
170. "Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the
Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement," May 1, 1991, available in
1991 WL 434200 (NAFTA).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. "Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the
Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement," May 1, 1991, available in
1991 WL 434196 (NAFTA).
Between 1989 and the beginning of 1991, the Mexican government ordered
some 980 temporary and 82 permanent closures of industrial facilities for fail-
ing to comply with environmental laws. In 1990, Mexico made the multi-
billion dollar decision to phase out leaded gasoline and to order that all new
cars, including over 40,000 Mexico city taxis, be equipped with catalytic con-
verters. The government also shut down all 24 military-industrial installations
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President Salinas articulated "that Mexico has no interest in becoming
a pollution haven for North America."1 " Finally, the review concluded
that NAFTA would not encourage United States firms to relocate to
Mexico because: (1) Mexican environmental law was comparable to
United States law, 176 (2) enforcement in Mexico was improving dra-
matically,1" and (3) the cost of complying with domestic standards
was generally too small a percentage of total costs to induce firms to
relocate.'
Nevertheless, even if the United States Executive office, the
USTR, and the EPA were correct in their assessment that the benefits
of NAFTA outweigh the costs, an argument of resulting benefits from
the action "is not relevant to the question of the existence of significant
environmental effects . , ""' Courts are unlikely to weigh beneficial
and detrimental effects, especially when the action is one that normally
requires an EIS, because an EIS requires disclosure of (1) "actions
which may lead to significant change in land use,"' 80 even if they do
in the Mexico City area because of potential environmental risks.
Most dramatically, President Salinas announced last month the perma-
nent closure of Mexico's largest oil refinery for environmental reasons. The
refinery had been responsible for an estimated 15 percent of Mexico City's
industrial air pollutants. The estimated cost of that shut-down is some $500
million and up to 5,000 jobs .... [In addition the] budget of the Mexican
environmental agency, SEDUE, has been increased almost eight-fold between
1989 and 1991 (from $5 million to $39 million).
Id. at 7-8.
174. "Hills Dispels NAFTA Myths," United States Trade Representative Carla
A. Hills, Sept. 21, 1992, available in 1992 WL 360151 (NAFTA).
175. "Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the
Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement," May 1, 1991, available in
1991 WL 434200 (NAFTA).
176. Id. These laws were patterned after United States domestic environmental
laws. Id.
177. Before operating, new businesses in Mexico must file an environmental com-
pliance program detailing how they will conform to the 1988 standards. "Hills Dispels
NAFTA Myths," United States Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, Sept. 21, 1992,
available in 1992 WL 360151 (NAFTA).
178. "Report of the Administration on the NAFTA and Actions Taken in Fulfill-
ment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments," Sept. 18, 1992, available in 1992 WL
360154 (NAFTA) (noting that compliance costs are less than two percent for most
industries).
179. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 880 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1)
(1993)).
180. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 881 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(a)(3)
(1984)).
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not result in a "complete devastation" of the land; 181 (2) actions that
cause "unique or unknown impacts;"182 (3) actions that damage ecolog-
ically critical areas, '" such as the U.S.-Mexico border; (4) actions of
a controversial nature,184 especially if they are purely economical, 85
which is the essence of NAFTA;' 86 (5) actions that set a significant
precedent; 18 7 or (6) actions that may violate "any local, state or federal
law that protects the environment."' 88
If the OTR had been required to do an EIS, it would have in-
cluded a succinct description of the environments or areas to be af-
fected by NAFTA,'89 a list of all reasonable alternatives to NAFTA, 190
a "scientific and analytic" evaluation of all the environmental conse-
quences 91 of each alternative, 92 and finally, a plan or "[m]eans to mit-
igate" such consequences. 19
B. Apply the Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine recognizes that "certain issues, be-
cause of their purely political character or because their determination
would involve encroachment upon the powers of the Executive or Legis-
lative Branches, should not be decided by the courts."1 94 Baker v.
Carr,1'5 the seminal case for the political question doctrine, set forth
the six ways in which a court can find that the doctrine applies. 98
181. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 880-81.
182. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (1993).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See generally, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp.
870 (D.D.C. 1991).
186. NAFTA is primarily an economic document. See generally supra notes 323
and accompanying text.
187. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (1993).
188. Id.
189. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.15 (1993).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), (E) (1993).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1993).
192. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1993).
193. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1993).
194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (6th ed. 1990).
195. 369 U.S. 186 (1962)(holding that a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
Tennessee's apportionment statute was not a nonjusticiable political question).
196. Id. at 217. The six ways are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department; [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; [3] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [4] the
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1. Committed To Other Branches
The Court has stated that "[tihe conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative - 'the political' - departments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."19 Even if foreign
policy is involved, the case will be justiciable 98 if it challenges the in-
terpretation of policy rather than the setting of policy. United States v.
Yoshida' 99 illustrates the distinction between the two challenges, stat-
ing that "[alt]hough courts will not normally review the essential politi-
cal questions surrounding the declaration or continuance of a national
emergency, they will not hesitate to review the actions taken in re-
sponse thereto or in reliance thereon."20 The former is simply unallow-
able; the latter is expected.20'
In the context of NAFTA, Public Citizen was not simply calling
for an interpretation of NAFTA but was making a challenge inti-
mately related to the government's foreign trade policy, which is consti-
tutionally committed to Congress20 2 and statutorily delegated to the
President and the OTR.20 3 There was a commitment by the leaders of
Canada, Mexico and the United States to make NAFTA effective by
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id.
197. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-12 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1918)). See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937).
198. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
199. 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Yoshida challenged the validity of a presi-
dential proclamation that levied an import duty surcharge on its products. Presidential
Proclamation 4074 was authorized by the Trading with the Enemy Act, which allows
regulation of trade during times of war or national emergency. Yoshida, 526 F.2d at
566.
200. Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 578-579.
201. Id. at 579.
202. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8.
203. The Trade Acts, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-91, 2901-09 (1993). The Trade Acts
make a broad delegation of power to the President and the OTR, and in Chicago &
Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 110 (1947), the Court stated that
it will scrutinize any statute that authorizes review in those instances that Congress has
exercised its authority to delegate "very large grants of its power over foreign com-
merce to the President ... as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs." Id. at 110.
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January 1, 1994. Mandating an EIS in September 1993,204 would have
undermined the "viability of the fast-track approval process. 205
2. Insufficient Standard
In Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 6 the court stated that the law-
suit was "another cog in the wheel of controversy currently surrounding
U.S. government involvement in Central America. 207 The court con-
cluded that it did "not have the resources and expertise required to
oversee U.S. military affairs in Central America ... which is the cur-
rent debate ... by both the Executive and Congress. 20 8 In a similar
vein, controversy surrounded the NAFTA negotiations. Labor, unfair
trade, and environmental issues all elicited considerable political and
public debate.
3. Beyond Judicial Discretion
In Concerned v. Schlesinger,0 9 a nuclear site was the subject of
controversy.21 0 Ultimately, "[a] question that might be answered in dif-
ferent ways for different amendments must surely be controlled by po-
litical standards rather than standards easily characterized as judicially
manageable"2"' because such policy "is not within the ambit of the
court's expertise or discretion." '12 Likewise, the environmental policy
commitments of NAFTA, a trilateral trade agreement stretching from
the "Arctic to Acapulco,"213 needed to be established by all the negoti-
ators - the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 4
204. Public Citizen IV was decided on September 24, 1993.
205. Appellant's Brief at 30-31, Public Citizen IV (No. 93-5212) (quoting Katz
Aff. para. 4).
206. 568 F. Supp. 596 (1983).
207. Id. at 602. Nicaraguan plaintiffs were seeking damages for alleged U.S.-
sponsored terrorist attacks on them, and Congressional plaintiffs were seeking an in-
junction against further military involvement in Nicaragua. Id. at 598. It was alleged
that the United States' involvement constituted a war unauthorized by Congress. Id.
208. Sanchez, 568 F. Supp. at 599, 602.
209. 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975).
210. Id. There were "ongoing international arms limitation negotiations" that re-
lated to the project. Id.
211. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
212. Concerned, 400 F. Supp. at 482.
213. J. Craig Crawford, It's a Deal: House votes for NAFTA, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al.
214. The three countries were in the process of negotiating an environmental side
agreement that incorporated trilateral standards.
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4. Respect For Coordinate Branches
The consistency of two United States bilateral nuclear agreements
with the policy of United States non-proliferation statutes was the issue
in Cranston v. Reagan.215 The court concluded that it would not, in a
post hoc fashion, "disturb the 'single-voiced' statement of the Govern-
ment's views on this issue" '216 because Congress had a statutorily-cre-
ated opportunity to protest." 7
The political process worked for NAFTA. To avoid adopting the
lowest common denominator environmental standard, United States
and Mexican officials negotiated options for resolving differences in the
environmental standards of the two countries. 18 The environmental
provisions of NAFTA, in short, state "that the toughest standards on
the books are the floor to which others should adjust, not a ceiling to be
lowered by compromise. '"219
5. Adherence To A Final Decision
In the legislative enacting process, absence of finality in a statute
"contribute[s] to judicial reluctance to inquire whether ... it complied
with all requisite formalities."220 Considerations of finality will arise
when the complaint of the plaintiff is central to an issue of political
power.221 Trade policy formulation, as opposed to interpretation, is cen-
tral to executive power - both statutorily"22 and symbolically.223 When
215. Cranston, 611 F. Supp. 253 (citing Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2282, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978)).
216. Cranston, 611 F. Supp. at 253-54 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
217. When the conflict is between the legislative and executive branches, it must
be resolved in the political process because "[s]uch matters are the archetype of those
best resolved through bargaining and accommodation ...." National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924-26 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Wilderness
Society v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
218. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT T-RCED-93-9 (1993).
Within NAFTA, there is an intricate procedure for dispute resolutions: the initial con-
sultations, NAFTA, Art. 2006, a Free Trade Commission, NAFTA, Art. 2007, an
arbitral panel, NAFTA, Art. 2008, and a panel of experts, NAFTA, Art. 2015.
219. John S. Rainey, What would NAFTA change?, COLUMBIA STATE, Nov. 14,
1993, at D3.
220. Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676-
677). See also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1992).
221. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 213-14 (stating that a public rent control pro-
gram, although important during a declaration of emergency, is not central to the
emergency effort).
222. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-91, 2901-09 (1993).
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President Clinton exercised his statutory authority to sign NAFTA into
law, he stated: "[w]e are on the verge of a global economic expansion
that is sparked by the fact that the United States, at this critical mo-
ment, decided that we would compete, not retreat."'"
6. Avoidance Of Embarrassment From Conflicting Pronouncements
The Supreme Court will not grant jurisdiction if the United States
would "risk embarrassment of our government abroad ' 225 as a result of
"multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion."' 2 10 In Cranston,22 7 the plaintiffs claimed that during the multilat-
eral nuclear negotiations, the defendants were to forecast and scruti-
nize proliferation risks of the initial agreements.2 28 The challenged
agreements were the product of five years of negotiation between Swe-
den, Norway, and the United States2 29 and had been approved by the
Swedish Government and the Norwegian Parliament.23 0 The Cranston
court stated:
Itihe challenged Agreements . . . have progressed through the
political processes of three nations and taken effect. Were this
Court to adopt a new stance, 'ignoring the delicacies of diplo-
matic negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the best solu-
tion of an international conflict, and the scope which in foreign
affairs must be allowed to the President, the 'symbolic impact'
would be grave indeed.231
223. A ceremony was held at the White House, two months prior to NAFTA
being voted on in Congress, at which President Clinton and former Presidents Bush,
Carter, and Ford all gave speeches in support of the agreement. NAFTA and Side
Agreements Before the House Ways and Means Committee (1993) (testimony of Sam
M. Gibbons) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
224. Ronald A. Taylor,Clinton Signs NAFTA, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A4.
225. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
226. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
227. 611 F. Supp. at 253.
228. Cranston, 611 F. Supp. at 250 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153, 2160 (1993)).
229. Cranston, 611 F.Supp. at 251.
230. Id. Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the authorizing statute, the Secre-
tary of State, with the aid of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the Secretary of Energy, negotiated the agreements and submitted them to
the President. Id. at 249 (citing the Atomic Energy Act § 123, 42 U.S.C. § 2153
(1993)). The President then approved the agreements and submitted them to Congress
along with a statement that the agreements "will not constitute an unreasonable risk[]
to the common defense and security." Cranston, 611 F. Supp. at 249 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2153(b) (1993)).
231. Cranston, 611 F. Supp. at 253 (quoting Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616
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With regard to NAFTA, "once the President undertakes trade ne-
gotiations ... he could be severely embarrassed by a judicial recall."2"2
Ultimately, "in foreign policy terms, NAFTA is a test of our
leadership. 233
C. Apply Equitable Market Considerations
Actions taken between the Department of State and "foreign offi-
cials . . . [to] facilitat[e] trade opportunities abroad and U.S. business
expansion in foreign markets" are categorically excluded from the EIS
requirement.23 4 Although these regulations were established by the De-
partment of State and not by the OTR, they address the types of inter-
ests that the Appeals Court in Public Citizen IVP85 could have been
tacitly protecting.
Justices are beginning to consider economic issues more fre-
quently.28 6 Today Supreme Court Justices are "more sophisticated in
economic reasoning, and they apply it in a more thoroughgoing way
than at any other time in our history. 23 7 They are beginning to con-
sider, with increasing sophistication, the effect of their decisions on eco-
nomic incentives on the margin. 2 8 Economic analysis in judicial hold-
ings may not always be overt, but there increasingly seems to be an
application by implication. Some cases that the Supreme Court has dis-
missed on issues of standing or separation of powers are "not explicitly
economic, but the principles lay just beneath the surface."2 3' 9 Whether
judges will incorporate economic considerations into a decision depends
on how they frame the issue, interpret the statute, and apply principles
of equity.
1. Issue Framing
The relationship between personal liberties and economic or gov-
ernmental interests greatly influence how the court frames the issue at
(D.C. Cir. 1973)). See also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
232. Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlich, Political Questions in International
Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989).
233. Id.
234. 22 C.F.R. § 161.7(b)(1)(1993).
235. 5 F.3d 549.
236. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
237. Easterbrook, supra note 236 at 5.
238. See generally id. at 33-42.
239. Id. at 42.
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hand.240 Incorporating market interests would marginally alleviate the
problem of dualism - the paradox of passionately defending personal
interests while often overlooking economic interests.
2 41
In Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Watt,24 2 the
CCNV brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior to challenge
the U.S. Park Service's denial of its members' requests to sleep in tem-
porary structures on government-owned land in downtown Washington,
D.C. The demonstrators wanted to bring attention to the plight of the
homeless. 243 The Interior Department, in exercising its authority to
maintain the national park system, 44 had previously issued a National
Park Service regulation prohibiting "camping" in the area where the
demonstrations took place. 45 Judge Mikva, who also wrote the opinion
in Public Citizen IV,246 recognized that the demonstrators were exercis-
ing a free speech right and framed the issue narrowly.247 The Park Ser-
vice's "interests must be weighed against only that activity which
CCNV seeks to do' sleep within tents that they have been given per-
mission to erect and at which they have been allowed to maintain a
twenty-four hour presence."2 48 The court concluded, "Why not allow
sleep? The effect [was] small, [and] the demonstrators few ....
The Supreme Court reversed this decision in Clark v. CCNV.
250
The Court recognized that the demonstrators had a free speech interest
in sleeping in the park;251 however, it pointed out that "it is evident
240. Id. at 19-20 (noting that in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt,
104 S.Ct. 3065 (1984), the Supreme Court framed the issue narrowly, avoiding intru-
sion on personal liberty while preserving a statutory governmental interest).
241. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 4, 5 (1987).
242. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
243. Id. at 586.
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1993).
245. 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1993). The regulation prolibits "the use of park land
for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities." Id. An individual will
be in violation of the regulation "regardless of the intent of the participants or the
nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging." 36 C.F.R.
7.96(g)(5)(vii).
246. 5 F.3d 549.
247. 703 F.2d at 596 (limiting the result of the decision to the acts of CCNV and
failing to extend the slippery slope to others who may want to sleep in the park).
248. Id.
249. Easterbrook, supra note 236 at 20.
250. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
251. 468 U.S. at 293 (stating that "overnight sleeping in connection with the
demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First
Amendment").
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from our cases that the validity of this regulation need not be judged
solely by reference to the demonstration at hand. 2 52 The Court,
"[i]nstead of asking, 'What is the effect of allowing these few people to
close their eyes?' . . . asked, in essence, 'What is the effect of camping
in the national parks near the White House?' "25
In Public Citizen IV, 54 the same approach could have been used
to support an economic-based analysis of the effects of applying NEPA
to NAFTA. Even after determining that NEPA could mandate an
EIS, the court could have avoided issuing an injunction by simply
broadening the perspective. Instead of asking, "What is the effect of
mandating an EIS for NEPA?" it could have asked, "What is the ef-
fect of opening up NAFTA to the application of all U.S. environmental
laws?"
2. Statutory Interpretation
Judges should not "set about rearranging economic relations on
the basis of an ambiguous statute without first resolving a question
about the nature of legislation. '2 55 Judges' philosophies on whether the
political process or the "invisible hand ' 2 56 moves markets influences
how they will interpret statutes. 257 The judges "who see market fail-
ures, and conceive statutes as means to correct these defects, will read
the statutes broadly and extend them to cover new cases."2 58 The
judges "who conclude that statutes generally displace markets ... will
take a more beady-eyed view." 259
In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,260 the Supreme Court
granted review under the APA for milk consumers who were discon-
tented about how the Secretary of Agriculture, milk buyers, and milk
producers used the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937261
to negotiate marketing agreements. 62 The consumers had commanded
252. Id. at 296-97 (citing Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981)). The dissent in the district court stated that it had to evalu-
ate the "government's interest in preventing camping generally." 703 F.2d at 618.
253. Easterbrook, supra note 236 at 20.
254. 5 F.3d 549.
255. Easterbrook, supra note 236 at 15.
256. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE EARLY WRITINGS OF ADAM SMITH (J.
Ralph Lindgren ed. 1967).
257. Easterbrook, supra note 236 at 14-18, 42.
258. Id. at 42.
259. Id.
260. 104 S.Ct 2450 (1984).
261. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1982).
262. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S.Ct. at 2455.
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no leverage in the agreement-making process.28 3 The Court, noting that
the objective of the act was served, upheld the agreement as "a cooper-
ative venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers[,] the prin-
ciple purposes of which [were] to raise the price of agricultural prod-
ucts and to establish an orderly system for marketing them." 2"
The general purpose of NEPA is to ensure that decisionmakers are
informed about the environmental consequences of their proposals. 65
Although the statute seems clear on its face, it has naturally been the
source of much litigation because agencies do not want regulatory
wrenches thrown into their decisionmaking process. Most of this litiga-
tion indicates that NEPA applies generally to bridge-building and tree-
cutting type operations.2"6 Since these actions are essentially local in
nature, local benefit is to be weighed against local environmental
detriment.26 7
It is apparent that this narrow interpretation would make NEPA's
EIS mandate inapplicable to NAFTA, a trilateral trade agreement
that will have international economic ramifications. 268 The OTR, in
carrying out its duties under the Trade Acts,26 9 has never been sub-
jected to NEPA or the CEQ regulations; moreover, it has never
adopted internal agency implementing procedures as directed by the
CEQ regulations.2 70 NEPA recognizes that agency action must be
263. Id.
264. Id. at 346. See also Easterbrook, supra note 236.
265. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
266. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (noting that "decisionmaking processes of federal agencies ... are uniquely
domestic").
267. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative (USTR), 782 F. Supp.
139, 141 (1992) (citing Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (stating that an EIS is to "inform
decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or min-
imize adverse impacts. . ."); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (stating that the purpose of NEPA is
"to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmen-
tal consequences. .. ").
268. While NAFTA is trilateral, its effects are multilateral. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral agreement, has a general requirement that
all signatories treat all other signatories equally. GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pt. 5,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, Art. I. Under NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
apply special trade rules to each other that they do not apply internationally. Thus, an
exception to GATT's Article I regime of equality had to be given to the three coun-
tries. GATT, Art. XXIV; See also NAFTA, Art. 101 (stating that the agreement is
consistent with Article XXIV of GATT).
269. 19 U.S.C. §8 2101-91, 2901-09 (1993).
270. 40 C.F.R. 8 1507.3(a) (1993).
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"consistent with the foreign policy of the United States." 71 Further-
more, the regulations provide "limited exceptions" for "proposed ac-
tions.., specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu-
tive Order .... "1272
In 1979, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,114278 to
"further[] the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act . . .
consistent with the foreign policy . . . of the United States ' 27 4 and to
avoid the possibility of coercion in negotiations where "the United
States . . . hold[s] the cards. 27 5 The executive order covers agency
actions that are "outside the United States ... which significantly af-
fect natural or ecological resources of global importance' 270  and
agency actions that provide "a product or physical project... which is.
strictly regulated by Federal law[s]. 277
In Greenpeace USA v. Stone,"8 plaintiffs asserted that the U.S.
Army and the Department of State were required to conduct an EIS on
an executive agreement between the United States and West Germany
designed to accelerate the destruction of weapons. 27 9 The executive
agreement "undoubtedly stemmed from diplomatic concerns ... clearly
beyond the purview of this court's review. '2 80 The court held that Ex-
ecutive Order 12,114281 was applicable because it addresses the issue of
environmental protection "in a way sensitive both to environmental and
foreign policy concerns. '"282
When applicable, the executive order mandates one of three proce-
271. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (1993).
272. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (1993).
273. 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
274. Exec. Order No. 12,114, §1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), 42 U.S.C.A. § 432.
275. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 760 (D. Haw. 1990) (quoting
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d
1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
276. Exec. Order No. 12,114, § 2-3(d), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
277. Exec. Order No. 12,114, § 2-3(c)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
278. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.D.C. 1990) appeal dismissed by, 924 F.2d 175 (9th
Cir. 1991).
279. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 749. In 1986, President Reagan entered
into an agreement with Chancellor Kohl to dispose of munitions in West Germany by
transporting them to Johnston Atoll, an unincorporated United States territory in the
vicinity of Hawaii. In 1989, President Bush and Chancellor Kohl made a further agree-
ment to accelerate the disposal. Id. at 752.
280. Greenpeace USA, 758 F. Supp. at 760.
281. 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
282. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 763 (quoting ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY-1979, THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, Dec. 1979, at 582.
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dures: (1) an EIS, (2) a bilateral or multilateral environmental study,
or (3) concise reviews of the environmental issues involved.28  An
agency may completely exempt itself from all three procedures if the
action was "taken by or pursuant to the direction of the President...
when the national . . . interest is involved[,] 'J 2 84 such as an intricate
treaty agreement. 285 The OTR drafted NAFTA, which affects a trilat-
eral market, only because President Bush initiated the trade negotia-
tions. 286 The OTR had no authority to act independently of the Presi-
dent's direction;2 87 therefore, it possibly could have exempted itself.
If it does not elect this exemption, an agency can modify the "con-
tents, timing and availability of documents" 288 when there is a neces-
sity to protect foreign relations, diplomatic factors, international eco-
nomic competition or commercial confidentiality. 289 The Appeals Court
in Public Citizen V290 could have declined to issue an injunction, rec-
ognizing the limited scope of NEPA and the broad discretion of the
President and agencies in foreign economic relations.
291
Rather than choosing an exemption or modification, the OTR
complied with two of the three procedures. 292 First, the OTR and the
EPA compiled and released an Environmental Review.293 Second, the
283. Exec. Order No. 12,114, §§ 2-4(a)(i)-(iii), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
284. Exec. Order No. 12,114, § 2-5(a)(iii), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
285. PEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(stating that "in situations where there is a substantial likelihood that treaty relations
will be affected ... [or] that EIS preparation would [have an] impact upon the foreign
policy of the United States . . . NEPA requirements [will] necessarily yield").
286. President Bush, June 11, 1990, endorsed the goal of a Free Trade Agreement
and directed USTR to begin the necessary consultations and preparatory work for a
round of negotiations. TRADE POLICY REVIEW, GATT PUBLICATIONS, April 1992, at
30. Once the negotiations have been authorized diplomatically with another country,
the USTR then has the authority to lead the negotiations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2171, 2411-17
(1993).
287. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-91 (1993).
288. Exec. Order No. 12,114, § 2-5(b), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
289. Exec. Order No. 12,114, §§ 2.5(b)(iii)(1)-(3), 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
290. 5 F.3d 549.
291. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding
President's degree of discretion in foreign affairs is greater than that in domestic af-
fairs); See also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in For-
eign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255; William P. Hovell,
Brian M. Mueller, & Kirk S. Schumacher, Separation of Powers - Congressional
Acquiescence to Executive Discretion in Foreign Affairs, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 868.
292. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
293. Report of the Administration on the NAFTA and Actions Taken in Fulfill-
ment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments, Sept. 18, 1992, Exec. Summ, 1992 WL
360154.
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OTR held trilateral negotiations on an environmental side agreement.
It is undeniable that "repairing the environmental damage to our
planet is not just the job of ... wealthy countries. It is the task of every
nation, and hence, solutions acceptable to all must be found. [A trade
agreement] is the logical forum to do this. 12 94
3. Equitable Application
Public Citizen sought an injunction which is "an equitable remedy
and does not issue as a matter of course. '2 9 5 In Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Hill,29' the Court decided whether to balance economic bene-
fit with environmental detriment. It was faced with the following por-
tion of the Endangered Species Act: "[a]ll persons, including federal
agencies, are specifically instructed not to 'take' endangered species,
meaning that no one is 'to harass, harm [or] wound . . .' such life
forms. ' 297 The Court refused "to balance the loss of a sum certain -
even $100 million - against a congressionally declared 'incalculable'
value."'298 However, the Court did concede that "this view of the Act
will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of
the project and of many millions of dollars in public funds. 299
The dissent emphatically contended that the Court did have dis-
cretion to weigh equitable factors when issuing injunctions. 300 The dis-
sent noted that the Supreme Court had "specifically held that a federal
court can refuse to order a federal official to take specific action, even
though the action might be required by law, if such an order 'would
work a public injury or embarrassment' or otherwise 'be prejudicial to
the public interest.' "301
The dissent also viewed equity broadly, as "more far reaching than
the adverse effect on the people of this economically depressed area is
the continuing threat to the operation of every federal project, no mat-
ter how important to the Nation. ' 0 2 Equitable considerations are in-
struments "for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
294. Michael B. Smith, GATT, Trade, and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533
(1993).
295. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 755 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Vil-
lage of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
296. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
297. Id. at 184-85 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(14), 1538(a)(1)(B) (1976)).
298. Id. at 188.
299. Id. at 174.
300. Id. at 213 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 210 (J. Powell, dissenting).
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interest and private needs." ' 3 Federal judges are to use their sound
discretion by applying flexibility and practicality rather than rigidity.3 "
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,30 5 the Court did not incor-
porate economic considerations into its analysis because the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA)30 6 protects endangered species "whatever the
cost;' ' 8°7 conversely, NEPA requests agency compliance only "to the
fullest extent possible."30 8 The CEQ explains that this phrase "means
that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with [section
102] unless existing law applicable to the agency's operations . . .
makes compliance impossible." 3 9
In Public Citizen IV,310 the court might have foreseen that the
application of NEPA, which simply imposes a costly procedural re-
quirement, would be a stepping-stone for the application of environ-
mental statutes like the ESA " which "covers every animal and plant
species, subspecies, and population in the world needing protection."312
The court may have been reluctant, at such an early stage in the life of
NAFTA, to use NEPA to open the door to such far-reaching substan-
tive environmental statutes like the ESA"'3
In Greenpeace USA v. Stone,314 the court had to decide whether to
balance the foreign policy issues involved against the environmental
objectives of NEPA. 18 The court determined that an agency will not
have to do an EIS "where U.S. foreign policy interests outweigh the
benefits derived from preparing an EIS ... or where the foreign policy
interests at stake are particularly unique or delicate."31 6 The President,
303. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 212 (quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).
304. Id. (J. Powell, dissenting) (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30, which speaks
of "flexibility rather than rigidity" in the federal courts).
305. 437 U.S. 153.
306. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
307. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1993).
309. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1993).
310. 5 F.3d 549.
311. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1993).
312. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 159, n.8 (quoting Keith
Shreiner).
313. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1993).
314. 748 F. Supp. 749.
315. Id. at 760.
316. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d at 535 (citing Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796
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in exercising his fundamental foreign policy powers, 1 had reached an
agreement, and the Department of Defense had already completed a
Global Commons Environmental Assessment.318 The Court concluded
that mandating an EIS would be contrary to foreign policy interests
because of the inevitable postponement of the date of completion in the
agreement.3 19 Time would be wasted while the EIS was being done and
while the adequacy of the EIS was being litigated.32 0 Issuing an injunc-
tion and requiring an EIS would have interrupted the President's care-
fully timed operation and would have forced a rescheduling of the de-
tailed plans.3 21
The court in Public Citizen I" 22 could have denied an injunction
based on an economic protectionist theory, similar to the dissent in
Tennesee Valley Authority v. Hill, or on a foreign relations protection-
ist theory, like the majority in Greenpeace USA v. Stone, or even on an
environmental protectionist theory.
The economic protectionist premise of applying NEPA to NAFTA
would undeniably defeat the agreement's objective. The purpose of
NAFTA is to create trade incentives by decreasing export and import
barriers and opening up a trilateral free market. 82 However, applica-
317. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 758.
318. Id. at 754. The Department of Defense was responsible to complete the envi-
ronmental assessment, although the Army actually did it. Id.
319. Id. at 760 (noting that the timing of the removal of the munitions was specif-
ically ordered in the agreement between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl).
320. Id. at 760.
321. Id. at 768.
322. 5 F.3d 549.
323. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Preamble, available in WESTLAW, IEL database. The Preamble states:
The Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada
and the Government of the United Mexican States, resolved to:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among
their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world
trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services pro-
duced in their territories;
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their
trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning
and investment;
BUILD on their respective rights and obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral instru-
ments of cooperation;
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tion of substantive environmental laws to NAFTA would defeat that
purpose by creating trade barriers through the imposition of United
States environmental standards.32 4 "Trade is the lifeblood of many na-
tions; it cannot be crucified on an environmental cross. Too many jobs
are at stake, and the politics are too large."32
The foreign relations protectionist premise might suggest that
NAFTA had already been negotiated and signed by the three partici-
pating countries. The OTR and the EPA had completed an Environ-
mental Review, and an environmental side agreement was near conclu-
sion. There was a commitment to have NAFTA and the side
agreements in effect by January 1, 1994, and the completion of an EIS
and the litigation that might ensue would postpone the agreed-upon
date. Therefore, "[a]lthough NEPA is clearly a procedural statute, its
application to the ... action would interfere with the substance of the
President's commitment."326
The environmental protectionist premise of applying NEPA to
NAFTA would potentially open to question many other state and fed-
eral environmental statutes of the United States. That is, application of
substantive environmental laws to NAFTA would potentially result in
a leveling of standards or a weakening of domestic substantive laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Difficult cases make bad law; Public Citizen IV is no exception. To
avoid deciding the merits of this case, the Appeals Court in Public Cit-
izen IV bifurcated the APA's "final agency action" requirement, in es-
sence, holding that the OTR could take no final action.
The immediate consequence of this holding was that NAFTA was
submitted to Congress without an EIS, evading the purpose of NEPA.
ENHANCE the competitiveness of their firms in global markets;
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and ser-
vices that are the subject of intellectual property rights;
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working condi-
tions and living standards in their respective territories; . . . [and]
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
324. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 188 n.34.
325. Smith at 544, supra note 294. "NAFTA will give us the tools to deal with
the economic issues and the environmental issues important to [the] United States,
Mexico, and Canada." NAFTA and Side Agreements Before the House Ways and
Means Committee (1993) (Testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator of the EPA)
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
326. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 761.
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However, Congress, in holding hearings on NAFTA, and President
Clinton, in negotiating an environmental side agreement, may have
remedied the OTR's failure to comply with NEPA.
The long-range effect of the bifurcation is that Public Citizen
IV 3 7 has precedential value for all agency action that must take a path
through the Presidential office. In light of the fact that the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia is the nucleus of APA and NEPA
litigation, this case may be used repeatedly to narrowly interpret the
word "final," to disregard the APA and NEPA framework, and to
overlook the intrinsic emergence of political conditions and economic
theories with equitable remedies. Indeed, it has already been used as
precedent for another trade negotiation.3 28
It is apparent that the court foresaw problems with halting a tri-
lateral agreement midway between the other two branches of govern-
ment; therefore, it should have fashioned a holding more in line with
this insight. The court conceded that
[t]he ultimate destiny of NAFTA has yet to be determined.
Recently negotiated side agreements may well change the
dimensions of the conflict that Public Citizen sought to have
resolved by the courts. More importantly, the political debate
over NAFTA in Congress has yet to play out. Whatever the
ultimate result, however, NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands
of the political branches. The judiciary has no role to play.32 9
This concession should have been the basis for application of either
the political question doctrine or equitable principles. Although the po-
litical question doctrine may not apply where the court is called to sim-
ply interpret a statute, such as NEPA, the ramifications of an interpre-
tation that would halt the negotiation or implementation of a trade
agreement could be politically severe. The Appeals Court should have
concluded that it would not issue such an injunction after considering
the interplay of sovereign environmental laws, delicate foreign rela-
tions, and international markets.
Taunya L. McLarty
327. 5 F.3d 549.
328. It was used as a basis to deny review of NEPA's applicability to GATT
1944. Public Citizen v. Kantor, 1994 WL 549498 (D.D.C. 1994). See supra, note 13.
329. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 553.
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